Summary:
● Origins of Putin’s fascism in Russia
● First steps toward establishing an authoritarian regime
● Political repression and political prisoners
● Legislative foundation of repression before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine
● The war against Ukraine and the final formation of the fascist vertical in Russia
● The face of Putin’s fascism
● Conclusion

Origins of Putin’s Fascism in Russia

One of the key factors that contributed to the rise of German fascism in the 1930s was a deep ressentiment generated by Germany’s defeat in World War I. In Russia, similar emotions were provoked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its defeat in the Cold War against the democratic nations of the West, accompanied by economic and social upheavals and a complete restructuring of people’s lives.

This ressentiment was cultivated by the Russian security services, which maintained continuity with their Soviet predecessors. The heirs of the Soviet KGB felt most acutely that they were on the losing side and carried within themselves a strong desire for revenge. During the period of democratic reforms, the new government failed to implement a full lustration of these structures; many senior security officials retained their positions and influence after the collapse of the USSR. Since 1917, despite the recent rebranding of the KGB as the FSB, the fundamental essence of this institution—primarily focused on eliminating ideological opponents and waging a cold war against the democratic world—remained unchanged.

The FSB, and Vladimir Putin personally, placed strong emphasis on preserving “historical traditions” and protecting the state from “troublemakers.” In practice, this meant full continuity with the KGB. The masks were finally removed in 2017, when the Russian security services officially celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Soviet security apparatus. The experience of Stalin’s Great Terror was reframed through the lens of “ambiguity” and “difficult times,” and the primary mistake was declared to be the extension of the 1937 repressions to the security services themselves.

Researchers of Soviet and Nazi totalitarian regimes often highlight an important difference: Soviet totalitarianism was largely focused on fighting “internal enemies” and on the assimilation of indigenous peoples living within the socialist empire. Mass killings on Soviet territory were justified as necessary for creating a new type of society — the so-called “Soviet person.” German fascism, meanwhile, focused on exterminating groups it labeled as “inferior races,” primarily Jews and Roma, as well as Slavs in occupied territories.

Modern Russian authoritarianism has managed to borrow practices and narratives from both of these monstrous and destructive regimes, while remaining non-ideological and mafia-like in its nature. The Putin regime officially employs chauvinistic rhetoric, the concept of the “Russian World,” and the myth of a divided Russian people, stoking ethnic hatred. During the full-scale war against Ukraine, this propaganda manifested in real persecution and abuse—up to and including the killing of people based on their nationality or ideological views.

The emergence of a neo-fascist regime in Russia might have been unlikely had power not passed from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin, an FSB officer and former KGB agent. This historical moment is a vivid example of how much an individual’s personality can influence the trajectory of a nation.

The First Steps Toward Establishing an Authoritarian Regime in Russia

Putin’s rise to power was predetermined by Boris Yeltsin’s decision to appoint him as his successor. Putin was elected president on May 7, 2000, after Yeltsin had previously appointed him Chairman of the Government on August 17, 1999, thereby strengthening Putin’s political position.

The FSB’s preparation for Putin’s ascent to the presidency included orchestrating the Second Chechen War, which began on August 7, 1999. Many experts accuse the FSB of playing a key role in the apartment bombings in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk between September 4 and 13, which killed 307 people and injured 1,700. These events created a compelling pretext for war and generated an atmosphere of emergency on the eve of the elections, greatly contributing to Putin’s rise.

An informal state of emergency persisted throughout Putin’s first two presidential terms due to the ongoing war in the Caucasus. Terrorist attacks continued to rock Russian cities.

A landmark moment was the hostage-taking at the Dubrovka theater on October 23, 2002, where more than 900 people were held by Chechen militants. This was Putin’s first major crisis. He chose to prioritize the elimination of the terrorists over the safety of the hostages. Special forces used a “sleeping gas,” which resulted in the deaths not only of the militants but also of many hostages. Of the 912 victims, many died partly because the authorities refused to disclose to doctors the secret formula of the gas used.

On September 1, 2004, another shocking tragedy occurred — the Beslan school hostage crisis, in which militants took 1,200 people hostage. The assault resulted in the deaths of 334 people, including 186 children, many of whom died due to the actions of special forces during the storming.

Amid these tragedies, Putin’s first presidential term marked a sharp trend toward the erosion of freedom of speech and an increase in media censorship, as well as the dismantling of several democratic institutions. The Kremlin orchestrated a hostile takeover of the Putin-critical television channel NTV and abolished direct gubernatorial elections. The Yukos case — which resulted in the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev for ten years and their recognition as political prisoners by human rights organizations — became a symbol of the suppression of economic independence and political opposition.

The Yukos trial, plagued by numerous violations, marked the beginning of a new era of political repression and the emergence of political prisoners in modern Russia. Putin not only punished the most influential entrepreneurs with political ambitions but also consolidated control over key sectors of the economy, ushering in an era of authoritarianism and systematic suppression of democratic institutions. Simultaneously, security forces were expanding their influence across all major sectors of the economy and government.

Another hallmark of Putinism became the demonstrative killings of prominent opponents of the security services and Putin himself. Several of the most notable examples include:

● Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist for Novaya Gazeta, was shot dead in 2007 — on Putin’s birthday. The perpetrators were identified, but those who ordered the killing were never found. Putin cynically commented that Politkovskaya’s death “caused more harm than her activities during her life,” implying he had no motive.

● Stanislav Markelov, a lawyer and left-wing activist, and Anastasia Baburova, a journalist, were murdered in central Moscow in 2009. Like Politkovskaya, Markelov defended Chechen civilians from abuses committed by Russian soldiers. The perpetrators turned out to be radical Russian nationalists with direct ties to the presidential administration.

● In the same year, Natalia Estemirova, a staff member of Memorial, was abducted and murdered. Politkovskaya, Baburova, Markelov, and Estemirova—all contributors to Novaya Gazeta—reported on enforced disappearances and war crimes in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.

● Boris Nemtsov, an opposition politician and former deputy prime minister, was assassinated in 2015 near the Kremlin, in an area under maximum surveillance. Nemtsov had been a serious political contender and could have challenged Putin in the 2018 presidential elections. Investigations were obstructed by the security services; only low-level perpetrators were prosecuted. Investigators were not allowed to pursue organizers linked to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

The most widely known recent political killing was the murder of Alexei Navalny in a penal colony in Kharp. This followed an earlier assassination attempt in 2020 using the nerve agent Novichok.

Political Repression and Political Prisoners

The term “political prisoners” became commonplace in Russia only after Putin came to power.

The human rights organization Memorial has been compiling a list of political prisoners for about twenty years. Today, however, beyond the hundreds of names included in Memorial’s list, there are thousands of people subjected to political repression who—for various reasons—never made it onto official lists. Here we focus on the most striking cases illustrating the stages of escalating repression, culminating in openly fascist practices after February 24, 2024.

Under Boris Yeltsin, political repression did not exist as a systemic phenomenon. Individual cases occurred, but they rarely resulted in imprisonment, and civil society often succeeded in mitigating punishments. Yet the First Chechen War severely undermined the young democratic institutions of the 1990s and paved the way for a former FSB lieutenant colonel to rise to power.

Under Putin, repression began with the targeting of his most prominent critics and gradually expanded to include anyone who held positions incompatible with his emerging system of power.

Political repression in Russia should be understood as criminal prosecution carried out by the authorities in violation of the law, the Constitution, and the rights of the accused. Repression targets both individual opponents and entire communities united by shared views or civic activism. The main goals are to suppress public activity among the disloyal and intimidate the rest, preventing the spread of information unwelcome to the authorities. Many victims are random people caught up in the system because security officials seek promotions.

It is essential to understand that any political prosecution in modern Russia is inherently unlawful, even if carried out under specially adopted legislation. Its legal purpose is to criminalize peaceful, constitutionally protected activity. No one targeted by the authorities can expect a fair investigation, an impartial trial, or even basic respect for their dignity and rights.

Today, thousands of people of different political beliefs, nationalities, professions, ages, and levels of public visibility are being persecuted in Russia. Most face intimidation, pressure, torture, and forced confessions; many are denied adequate legal representation, which has become extremely difficult or impossible.

The first large-scale political repression campaign targeted the National Bolshevik Party (NBP). Its members regularly organized protests that previously would have resulted only in administrative penalties. However, with the goal of crushing the organization, NBP activists were charged under criminal statutes, and several were sentenced to prison. Human rights defenders supported them despite profound ideological differences, as NBP members rejected many principles of human rights. The party was eventually declared extremist and banned.

In December 2011, parliamentary elections took place in Russia. The non-parliamentary opposition successfully drew public attention to the campaign. Thousands of volunteers served as election observers. The results showed widespread fraud in favor of the ruling party. Russian society reacted with mass protests in dozens of major cities.

At the same time, the public protested Vladimir Putin’s intention to run for a third presidential term. In 2008, following constitutional requirements, Putin stepped down and endorsed Dmitry Medvedev as his successor. Medvedev’s first term saw a revival of many democratic institutions previously suppressed under Putin. Society expected Medvedev to run for re-election. However, in September 2011, Medvedev unexpectedly announced he would not run and proposed Putin as the candidate, suggesting a “swap” of roles. This maneuver allowed Putin to bypass the constitutional limits of two consecutive presidential terms.

Protesting Putin’s return, the opposition organized large demonstrations in central Moscow in May 2012. During one of these rallies, police provoked clashes with peaceful protesters on Bolotnaya Square. Authorities claimed the violence had been deliberately orchestrated by the opposition. Around 400 people were detained, and more than 30 were charged with assaulting police and mass disorder. Sentences reached up to 6.5 years in prison.

During Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity,” and following the annexation of Crimea and the start of war in Donbas, Russia intensified the construction of a rigid system of propaganda and censorship. Totalitarian-style techniques returned to state media, alongside nationalist narratives. Pressure on independent outlets increased dramatically. A wave of repression followed against nationalist groups refusing to support Putin’s “Crimea policy.” Activists investigating Russia’s role in Donbas and the deaths of Russian soldiers were also persecuted. Criminal cases on extremism and “calls for separatism” were selectively opened against grassroots activists supporting Ukraine. Several terrorism cases were brought against Ukrainians in occupied Crimea, including film director Oleg Sentsov.

By 2017–2018, repression reached a new level, affecting not only explicit political opponents but also apolitical youth who simply failed to demonstrate ideological conformity. At the same time, the authorities reacted nervously to Navalny’s presidential ambitions and his explosive corruption investigations, which triggered mass protests across Russia.

In essence, the authorities began constructing a system in which ideological diversity was fully subordinated to state control, with special attention directed toward youth who showed interest in Navalny and rejected the regime’s conservative narratives.

Legislative Framework of Repressions Before the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

After the 2012 protests, the Russian government, seeking to contain a new wave of discontent, radically changed the legislative framework in the direction of tightening control over civic and human rights activities.

This happened in several stages and included:
● tightening of laws regulating freedom of assembly
● tightening of laws on combating extremism and terrorism
● adoption of the law on “undesirable organizations”
● adoption and gradual tightening of laws on so-called “foreign agents”

Starting approximately from 2017–2018, the already broadly interpreted concepts of terrorism and extremism steadily became even broader and more abstract, and the list of corresponding criminal articles was expanded. At the same time, “terrorist” articles were transferred to the jurisdiction of military courts and removed from the consideration of jury courts. Persons accused under terrorist and extremist articles began to be included in the lists of extremists and terrorists even before court verdicts, which led to the immediate blocking of their bank accounts.

Calls for violence or incitement of hatred or enmity ceased to be mandatory elements of “extremist activity”. By 2021, calls for peaceful protests not approved by the authorities were already being treated as extremism, and ordinary criticism of the authorities — as “incitement of hatred or enmity” toward their representatives. Similarly, the concept of “terrorist activity” lost its obligatory connection with the commission and preparation of terrorist attacks, turning into a formal involvement in some abstract “terrorist activity”, for example, on the basis of leaflets or a badge allegedly found during a search.

Laws on extremism and terrorism began to be actively used to persecute people for statements on the internet. The most “popular” became the article on “justification of terrorism”, which provides for up to 6 years in prison for anyone who expressed themselves ambiguously regarding what the Russian authorities have labeled as terrorism. According to the Avtozak LIVE project, more than 350 people in Russia are being prosecuted for statements under this article, of whom more than 100 have already been sentenced to imprisonment.

The concepts of an extremist or terrorist organization or community, as well as participation in their activities, also acquired maximally broad interpretations. The concept of a “community” made it possible to abandon the formal features of an organization defined by judicial practice, such as a charter, governing bodies, allocation of roles, etc.

The most striking example is the persecution of Alexei Navalny’s organizations and supporters in 2021.

Investigations by the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), revealing the scale of corruption in the highest echelons of power, caused a broad public outcry. Seeing Alexei Navalny as a real competitor, Vladimir Putin sanctioned Navalny’s poisoning with the secret military nerve agent “Novichok” in August 2020. After falling into a coma, Navalny was evacuated from Russia, which saved his life. A thorough investigation conducted with Navalny’s participation uncovered all the details of this poisoning, including the names of the FSB officers who organized this crime. In addition, facts about other poisoning attempts on opposition figures were made public, among them Dmitry Bykov and twice — Vladimir Kara-Murza. In the eyes of Russian citizens, Putin and the security services were taking on an increasingly cruel and inhumane image.

In January 2021, Alexei Navalny, having partially recovered after the poisoning, made a principled decision to return to Russia. He was immediately arrested on fabricated grounds by the security forces upon arrival at the airport in Moscow. Navalny’s supporters responded with a series of mass peaceful demonstrations in Moscow and other Russian cities. After that, in a closed court process, the authorities declared FBK and Navalny’s political structures an “extremist organization” and launched a large-scale criminal prosecution of the politician’s associates.

But the authorities did not limit themselves to liquidating FBK and Navalny’s regional structures and adopted a number of laws that stripped ordinary Navalny supporters of their rights and introduced “retroactive force of the law” against them. At present, any Russian citizen who supported Alexei Navalny and his organizations even in the past, for example by participating in rallies or making donations, may at any moment receive up to 6 years in prison as a “participant in an extremist community”. There are no more than 30 such cases across the country, but their nature is such that very many people are forced to live in fear.

Another major protest organization that was crushed in 2021 was the “Open Russia” movement associated with Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The law on so-called “undesirable organizations” was applied to this movement, which entails a ban on activities in Russia and opens the way for criminal prosecution for organizing the activities of an “undesirable organization”. No more than 30 such cases are known. Basically, this law is aimed at depriving NGOs and media of the ability to work in Russia and at making the dissemination of their materials as difficult as possible.

In particular, the human-rights project “Team 29”, which defended those prosecuted in cases of treason and state secrets, was closed as an “undesirable organization”. In such cases, there was also a tightening and expansion of concepts: treason began to cover almost any activity arbitrarily interpreted as threatening the country’s defense capability, and the disclosure of state secrets ceased to depend on a security clearance or awareness of the classified status of information. However, prosecution under these articles, although characterized by cruelty and complete closedness from society, did not have a mass character until the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

The laws on “foreign agents”, originally aimed at stigmatizing and demonizing the human rights movement, gradually turned into a powerful repressive tool. State propaganda actively implanted in citizens’ minds the idea of the hostility of human rights defenders, portraying them as “enemies of the people”. Under pressure from the new laws and because of the impossibility of finding domestic funding, many NGOs were forced to cease their activities. Over time, however, not only NGOs but also media outlets and even individuals began to be labeled as foreign agents. Restrictions for foreign agents were gradually tightened and became increasingly absurd.

At present, the register of foreign agents includes dozens of organizations and media outlets, and hundreds of individuals. Such criteria as foreign funding and political activity are no longer required for inclusion in this register. The lists of foreign agents today include practically all politicians, human rights defenders, and cultural and artistic figures disloyal to the authorities. For failing to comply with the requirements of the foreign agent laws, including the requirement of degrading labeling of any public messages, up to and including comments on social networks, not only large fines are envisaged, but also criminal prosecution leading to imprisonment for up to three years. At least 13 such criminal cases are known to have been opened in Russia.

The culmination of the deliberate campaign against civil society organizations were the decisions of Russian courts to liquidate leading human rights organizations, including the Movement “For Human Rights” (2019), “International Memorial” (2021), and the Human Rights Center “Memorial” (2022). Their liquidation became a symbolic act, underscoring Russia’s decisive rollback toward authoritarian forms of governance. One of the grounds for their liquidation were references to formal and easily remediable violations of the foreign agents law.

In October 2022, the liquidated “Memorial” was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. And in 2023, the “Sakharov Center” and the “Moscow Helsinki Group” were also liquidated.

The Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 and the Establishment of Fascism in Russia

Everything described above acquired horrifying proportions after the beginning of the full-scale war against Ukraine. The legislative framework of repression and censorship expanded, punishments were toughened, and arbitrariness and lawlessness became total. The level of police violence and abuse of detainees increased many times over, and pressure and torture became a systematic practice, encouraged by propaganda and facing no opposition at the official level.

With the start of the war, de facto military censorship was introduced in Russia. Tens, if not hundreds of thousands of people were subjected to detentions, administrative penalties, threats, and pressure for their anti-war stance. Hundreds of people faced criminal prosecution for anti-war statements under articles on “spreading fakes about the army” (up to 10 years in prison) and “discrediting the army” (up to 3 years in prison). Many more people were subjected to extremely harsh criminal prosecution under articles on treason, terrorism, and sabotage. In such cases, torture is systematically applied, hearings are held behind closed doors, and sentences can reach life imprisonment. It is not uncommon for minors or very elderly people to be prosecuted under all these articles, and “terrorism” is defined as an attempt to set fire to a military enlistment office. The real scale of these repressions exceeds the capacity of human rights defenders and journalists to identify their new episodes. It is also difficult to assess the scale of repression against Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories. All of these repressions are conditioned by the war.

It is important to understand how Russia arrived at this war. In the spring of 2020, Putin effectively announced his intention to rule for life and initiated amendments to the Constitution in order to “reset” his presidential terms and obtain the possibility of running for president in 2024 and 2030, in direct violation of the constitutional limit. The introduction of amendments and their adoption through a nationwide vote grossly violated the Constitution of Russia and existing laws; the vote took place outside the legal framework provided by law, and its results were falsified.

But Putin’s popularity continued to decline, as social problems remained unresolved and the economy stagnated. The demand for change was growing, expressed in direct support by Russians for opposition candidates in elections at all levels.

As a result, in 2022 Putin decided on a full-scale aggression against Ukraine. It is quite possible that this war was to a large extent predetermined by Putin’s desire to regain lost support and control, playing on the older generation’s nostalgia for the USSR and the image of a strong, great Russia.

Putin can rightfully be called a “President of War”. He began his presidential career with the war in Chechnya. In 2008, he initiated the war between Russia and Georgia. In 2014, he seized Crimea and unleashed war in the Donbas. On 24 February 2022, he invaded Ukraine. It is difficult to assess now how close he was to success, but at some point his troops were threatening Kyiv. However, they were then pushed back, encountering fierce resistance along the entire front line.

Two years into the war, Putin proclaimed his victory in the presidential election with an incredible result of 87%, trying to convince everyone of an unprecedented growth in his support. But in reality, according to analysts’ estimates, between 22 and 30 million votes were added to Putin’s result through falsifications — and this despite total government control over elections, an unprecedented level of censorship and repression, and the exclusion of real opponents of Putin from running. Even under these conditions, Putin’s real result may fluctuate around 50–60% of those who voted, making a second round of elections quite likely.

This situation clearly shows that Putin is not popular enough to secure himself lifelong rule. To stay in power, he needs a constant increase of repressions and total control over society. And as hopes for a quick victory in Ukraine faded, the war turned into the main instrument for maintaining power.

By the spring of 2024, the war had reached an impasse. Ukraine, facing a huge shortage of weapons due to the interruption of supplies from the West, shifted to a prolonged defensive posture. Russia, possessing significant superiority in resources and retaining the ability to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure, is preparing a large-scale offensive. The success of this offensive will undoubtedly come at a high cost not only to Ukraine, but also to European countries — and, of course, to Russian citizens themselves.

The only way to bring the end of the war closer today is to provide decisive support to Ukraine by supplying all necessary heavy weapons, aircraft, sufficient quantities of shells and long-range missiles. Military successes strengthen Putin’s regime, making it even more cruel and dangerous. Ukraine’s military successes, on the contrary, give hope to Russian civil society.

Russian civil society has faced an unprecedented level of repression during the war, but continues to resist.

This was most vividly demonstrated in the months preceding Putin’s re-election. Massive support was given to Yekaterina Duntsova and then Boris Nadezhdin, who declared themselves opponents of Putin’s policies and represented anti-war-minded Russians. The refusal to allow these candidates to run led to the consolidation of civil society around protest voting, which turned into a large-scale anti-war action through the simultaneous arrival of Putin’s opponents at polling stations both inside Russia and at Russian consulates in dozens of countries around the world. Another striking example of mass protest was the farewell to Alexei Navalny after his killing.

For the first time since the start of the war, Russians became aware of the mass character of anti-war protest and gained hope for a peaceful transfer of power. Further growth in civic activity may become a real factor in ending the war and initiating democratic transformations in Russia.

Realizing this, Putin continuously tightens repressions. Memorial’s list includes the names of 691 political prisoners, but even Memorial itself emphasizes that this list cannot be complete. We are talking about the emergence of dozens of new criminal cases every month. At the same time, according to various estimates, up to a million people have left Russia, fleeing repression and mobilization. Repressions are taking on an increasingly totalitarian and mass character.

The latest examples that we are observing in Russia are the persecution of lawyers involved in political trials and journalists covering these trials. Criminal prosecutions have been initiated against the lawyers who defended Alexei Navalny. They have been taken into custody. Also taken into custody was journalist Antonina Favorskaya, who covered practically all court hearings involving Alexei Navalny, including his last trial in Vladimir. In the footage, it was clear that he felt fine and was joking. The next day, he was killed. Simultaneously with Favorskaya, journalist Olga Komleva in Ufa was taken into custody; she had been reporting on mass protests in Bashkortostan and the trials of Navalny associate Lilia Chanysheva.

These new criminal cases establish a practice whereby any lawyer defending someone accused of extremism or terrorism, as well as any journalist covering such processes, may also be recognized as an extremist or terrorist and subjected to criminal prosecution.

This opens the way to trials of “extremists” and “terrorists” without the participation of lawyers, in closed court sessions, in fact returning to the methods of Stalinist repressions, when sentences were handed down extrajudicially by “troikas” consisting of NKVD (KGB) representatives, the regional party committee secretary, and a prosecutor, who sent people to be shot or to camps and prisons for terms of 8 to 10 years.

The Face of Putin’s Fascism

The horrifying terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall on 22 March 2024, which claimed the lives of 144 people, pushed the authorities to the next step of open fascisization.

Putin publicly and without the slightest grounds declared Ukraine to be involved in the attack, and this narrative is being actively promoted by propaganda. At the state level, a discussion has been initiated about bringing back the death penalty, despite the constitutional ban confirmed by the position of the Constitutional Court. One of the screaming symptoms of the degradation of the law enforcement system in Russia were the public and demonstrative acts of torture of those detained on 23 March on suspicion of committing the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, which received no legal assessment and not the slightest hint of official condemnation. We are talking about the publication of videos showing suspects having their ears cut off and being tortured with electric shocks. And on 2 April it became known that a Chechen man detained on the evening of the day of the attack had died in police custody. His body in the morgue bore numerous signs of torture.

In fact, an official course was proclaimed toward normalizing violence and torture against the “enemies of society”.

Citizens of Tajikistan were named as the perpetrators of the attack. This led pro-government propaganda to shift to inciting hatred on the basis of nationality and also provoked an intensification of police arbitrariness against migrants in Russia from the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. More than 400 people were expelled from Russia in a short period of time.

These manifestations of overt fascism complemented practices already formed during the war. Let us cite some of the most striking examples.

A young man wrote on social media the comment “why ‘Krokurs’ and not the Kremlin?”, for which he was charged with “justifying terrorism” and now faces up to 6 years in prison.
A person who wrote on social media about the bombing of the theater in Mariupol, referring to publications in the media, was sentenced to 8 years under the article on “fakes about the army” for this. Under this article, dozens of people have received sentences ranging from 7 to 10 years, among them politicians and human rights defenders as well as ordinary people, journalists, and activists.
Any anti-war statements, even the most neutral ones like “No to war”, are prosecuted under the article on “discrediting the army”, with a possible sentence of up to 3 years in prison.

Within this practice, one of the most well-known human rights defenders in Russia, 70-year-old Oleg Orlov, a laureate of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Memorial, was sentenced to 2.5 years. He was convicted under the article on “repeated discrediting of the army” literally for an anti-war article entitled “They Wanted Fascism. They Got It.” Oleg Orlov is being held in a pre-trial detention center, awaiting appeal, in extremely harmful and exhausting conditions for someone of his age.

Another characteristic fascist manifestation was the designation of the LGBT community as an extremist group at the end of 2023. Since no such organization actually exists, this created a real threat to the freedom and safety of 7% to 10% of people with non-traditional sexual orientation, if they in any way publicly declare themselves. In fact, people are declared criminals on the basis of how they were born. But this can affect not only LGBT people, but also those who in one way or another distribute artistic works, scientific data, or even symbols resembling LGBT symbols. The first criminal case under the ban on LGBT was initiated in March 2024 in the city of Orenburg under the article on organizing the activities of an extremist community, under which the defendants face up to ten years in prison.

The persecution of LGBT people and Jehovah’s Witnesses is a literal copy of Hitler’s Nazi regime.

Another aspect of the militarization and ideologization of Russian society has been the introduction of propaganda and the informal persecution of dissent at all levels of life in Russia, starting from school. “Patriotism lessons” have been introduced into school education, and youth patriotic organizations are being created, with “patriotism” interpreted as support for Putin and the war in Ukraine and hatred toward the West.

Culture and the arts have also come under the scrutiny of repression and tight state control. Many writers, musicians, actors, and other cultural figures who do not support the war have been labeled foreign agents, extremists, and terrorists. Their works are banned from publication and distribution. Publishers and concert venues are put under pressure and forced to refuse cooperation with ostracized authors. Many have been forced to emigrate in order to avoid persecution.

Another distinctive feature of the regime, openly promoted and encouraged, has been the practice of informing (denunciation), which even involves schoolchildren. A striking example was a teacher’s report to the police about a schoolgirl, Masha Moskaleva, who drew an anti-war picture in art class. After this denunciation, the security forces began to persecute her father and eventually opened a criminal case against him under the article on “discrediting the army”, while the girl was sent to an orphanage, where she remained until she was taken by her mother, who had not previously lived with her.

All of this, brought to life by Putin, testifies to the formation of a fascist ideology of power in Russia, allegedly based on traditional and national values. However, in reality the Putin regime has no ideology of its own, and this is its main difference from its historical predecessors. The expansion of Putinism is not the creation of a new monstrous civilizational project, but the expansion of a criminal empire. Ideological constructs in the hands of Putin’s fascism are merely a practical tool for retaining power. Its true essence is the justification of arbitrariness, the omnipotence of the security services, boundless theft, the trampling of human dignity, dehumanization, atomization of society, and the incitement of hatred toward other peoples, as well as the justification of aggressive war and war crimes.

And on this terrible path, Putin’s fascism still has room to develop, if efforts are not made to stop it.

Conclusion

This report highlights the evolution of Russian fascism and examines its key elements. Before concluding, I considered it necessary to share my own reflections on how long fascism may continue in Russia and whether there are internal forces capable, with the support of the international community, of resisting this threat.

My hopes are strengthened by the fact that a new generation has emerged in Russia, raised after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This generation is not burdened with the imperial mentality that Putin is trying to exploit for his own purposes. It grew up under the relative freedoms of the 1990s and early 2000s, actively uses social networks, had the opportunity to travel before the “Iron Curtain” was effectively restored, and is well aware of the advantages of democracy and human rights. These people value freedom and are not prepared to give it up.

Today, our understanding of fascism is much deeper than it was in the 1930s. We understand its consequences and know that it is critically important to recognize its formation. However, recognition is not the same as neutralization. Fascism is not only the suppression of dissent, but also a cult of personality that generates the myth of a leader who saves the world by force. This myth is most effectively destroyed by the leader’s weakness, by his transformation into a comical and pitiful figure. A personalist fascist ideology is most effectively broken by the desacralization of its key figure, by demonstrating mass rejection of him by the people.

The events of early 2024 showed that two years of war, marked by horrific news of shelling, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, and the loss of prospects and peaceful hopes, have not broken the will of Russian civil society to resist. The decisive role in this resistance belongs to the younger generation, which supported anti-war candidates, laid flowers at the grave of Alexei Navalny, and called on people with anti-war views to gather at polling stations to demonstrate the lack of support for Putin. The youth is ready for change and longs for peace and freedom for Russia. It is also important to note that politically active supporters of Putin make up little more than 10–15%. A significant part of the Russian population, which is traditionally assumed to agree with the authorities, is passive. The anti-war community is more energetic and better organized, and at a moment of regime weakness it will be able to exert a decisive influence on the situation in the country.

But the conditions in which Russian civil society finds itself today require resolute support from free democracies. Real instruments of political influence will become available to Russians when the Putin regime is weakened by targeted personal sanctions and the failure of its plans in the war against Ukraine, and when it ceases to effectively cope with the tasks of censorship and suppression of civic activity. From this follow the tasks of supporting Ukraine and assisting the anti-war resistance of Russians.

I want to call on free democracies to recognize this resistance in Russia. I ask that possibilities be found to provide assistance to all Russians who are forced to flee persecution in Russia. By finding refuge in European countries, they continue to undermine support for Putin, counter propaganda, and spread independent information. I urge that ways be found to help them in this.

No less important is the call to find ways to support the thousands of the bravest and most active Russians who continue to carry out these tasks inside Russia. Many media outlets, human rights organizations, and political groups that are critically important for Russian society are on the verge of collapse, unable to secure stable funding in Russia and not finding support in European countries.
At the same time, their work creates a chance for a peaceful transformation of power in Russia, which would help avoid catastrophic scenarios of the country’s disintegration, civil wars, and the loss of control over weapons of mass destruction.

Yes, this process promises to be difficult and long. The key condition for its beginning is a change of the political elite in Russia. The way in which this will happen remains uncertain for now, but change is inevitable. Yet if there is no active effort to facilitate it, the price may prove too high.

It is important to understand today that Putin’s fascism has no peaceful plans. The outcome of the war with Ukraine will be a decisive factor determining the vector of political processes in Russia for a long time to come. Ukraine’s defeat or the consolidation of the results of aggression will seriously strengthen Putin’s position and push him toward a further escalation of confrontation with the Free World and of repression inside the country.

Decisive resistance to Putin’s fascism, on the other hand, will weaken the positions of dictatorships and autocracies around the world and give a chance to build a safer and more predictable world for future generations, freeing enormous energy to address the global challenges facing humanity.

Lev Ponomarev, 2 April 2024.