The recent Peace Summit in Switzerland, the appeal of Nobel laureates, and the subsequent statements have given rise to predictions about a transition to peace negotiations by the end of 2024. The main arguments: huge losses (both military and civilian), a frozen front line, and the burden of the war on the global economy. But how interested is Putin in starting peace negotiations? The situation in Ukraine is difficult, with mobilization and constant strikes on infrastructure in a context of critical dependence on allies, possibly prompting Putin to continue to achieve his goals. Awaiting the exhaustion of Ukraine’s internal forces, working on divisions within Ukrainian society and its international support system, and hoping for political changes in the USA and Europe. Russia’s economy is actively shifting to a military footing, forming stable beneficiary groups among both the elites and the most disadvantaged segments of the population. Russia’s international logistics chains are also geared towards the needs of the military economy. The transition to a peacetime economy is an extremely difficult and painful process. Finally, a sustainable peace process means the release of hundreds of thousands of people with combat experience, including amnestied prisoners. Their return to civilian life will be fraught with enormous difficulties. The authorities promise them honors, social benefits, positions in government bodies, and public institutions. But fulfilling these promises will be problematic. In the event of successful peace negotiations, a massive number of unneeded, traumatized people who risked their lives, lost friends, jobs, health, and any prospects in life will be left on the margins of society in Russia. The authorities will not be able to sufficiently control the weapons returning from the war. The major beneficiaries of the war are also well aware of their potential uselessness if the war ends. Among them are people who actively exploit the ideology of war and nationalism, making huge profits and gaining influence. This group includes major oligarchs, such as Malafeev, who has been financing the invasion of Ukraine since 2014. This group has roots in the Russian Orthodox Church, the army, security structures, and major propaganda media. Add to this the military resources: effectively fighting units, integrated into the army structure but holding a special position there.

Men in military uniforms pay tribute to the late Yevgeny Prigozhin near an unofficial memorial 40 days after his death, near the Kremlin in Moscow, October 1, 2023. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA-EFE A year ago, “Wagner” led by Prigozhin dominated the media unchallenged. But now, less media-exposed but even more cohesive formations of openly fascist and Nazi nature are operating at full strength: for example, “Rusich” and “Espanola”. Notably, there is the “Imperial Legion” — an organization not only recognized as terrorist in several countries but also representing a far-right political movement. What will happen to all these structures if peace negotiations begin? Putin and his entourage are likely wary after Prigozhin’s rebellion. It is unknown to what extent Putin himself supports the functioning of all these structures, but he certainly does not need their strengthening. War remains the only way to ensure their “full employment” and control their numbers. The peace process will exacerbate this problem. But on the other hand, continuing the war leads to an even greater aggravation, just deferred in time. The influence and capabilities of the ideologically armed wing will grow, changing the balance in Putin’s entourage. The growing degradation of the social sphere, intensifying already noticeable tensions in the regions, will not disappear from this equation. War cannot be eternal. Peace negotiations are inevitable in any case. And in any case, they can cause political destabilization. The start of negotiations will be perceived by the overwhelming majority of Russian society with immense relief and hope. The danger comes precisely from the radical nationalist wing. And with the continuation of the war or the delay in peace negotiations, it will only increase, including through the expansion of the radicals’ social base. In the event of destabilization, the most adequate and moderate part of Putin’s entourage risks finding itself in mortal danger. They will simply be sidelined, their assets will be plundered. Everyone will be reminded of their entire history: corruption for some, nationality or origin for others, insufficient zeal for still others. Serious destabilization can lead to the collapse of the state, with catastrophic consequences far beyond Russia’s borders. Neither the Russian democratic opposition, the collective West, nor the majority of Putin’s elites are interested in this.

A woman holds a sign reading “I am Russian and I am against the war” during a rally in Cologne, Germany, February 28, 2022. Photo: Focke Strangmann / EPA-EFE What needs to be done to prevent such a scenario? First. The moderate part of Putin’s elites, saving themselves, can establish contacts with the main leaders of civil society — their natural allies in the matter of exiting the war and preventing chaos in Russia. The sincere support of millions of people interested in a peaceful transformation of power can become a key stabilizing factor, preventing the country from falling into political chaos. This support can only be ensured by real steps: the release of political prisoners and the securing of guarantees for the legal participation of the opposition in the political process. The first public step confirming the prospects for dialogue at the national level should be the release of political prisoners who, in prison, are catastrophically losing their health and need quality treatment. There are all legal possibilities for this: release on health grounds, amnesty, or pardon. Second. The Russian democratic opposition — both inside the country and abroad — remains the most adequate, influential, and organized civil force in Russia. But as a subject of the negotiation process and the future political transformation of Russia, it needs to demonstrate a much higher level of unity and cooperation. The opposition must pre-agree on its response to various scenarios of political developments in Russia, reach preliminary agreements on joint actions and mutual support. These agreements should involve leading civil and human rights initiatives, as well as representatives of opposition media. Third. The West must proceed from the fact that there are arguments that convince Putin to continue the war and give him hope for success. Putin must understand that ending the war is the only way out, including for him. Ukraine and the West have the real opportunity to help their natural ally — the Russian opposition — by including in the basic package of demands the release of Russian political prisoners. But this Western position can only be supported by a united, democratic opposition, relying on its supporters in Russia, demonstrating the ability to cooperate and overcome differences for a common goal. P.S. We are aware that what we have said may raise doubts, fears, and criticism. But the discussion should be about the substance, not convenient topics. The basis of the working agenda and public discussion should be practical questions about Russia’s immediate future.