The escalation of the conflict between the United States and Iran once again raises the question of the limits of power-based policy and the ability of international institutions to fulfill their fundamental function — preventing the expansion of war. Of particular concern is the fact that this escalation is occurring against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and the overall weakening of international legal deterrence mechanisms.

In such circumstances, it seems logical to turn not only to bilateral or regional diplomatic channels, but also to the instruments available to the United Nations. The UN was created precisely as a universal structure for responding to threats to international peace and security. However, in practice, calls for its active involvement are becoming increasingly rare. This is primarily due to the accumulated skepticism regarding its actual effectiveness.

The limitations of the UN have been most clearly demonstrated in connection with Russia’s war against Ukraine. The General Assembly has repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression and reaffirming the fundamental principles of international law. However, the Security Council has proven unable to take effective action, as Russia, as a permanent member, has blocked decisions through its veto power. This experience once again highlights a structural problem of the current international security system: a universal organization depends on a mechanism in which permanent members of the Security Council can paralyze the collective will of the majority of states.

At the same time, actions by the United States outside its territory have also often been carried out without полноценное international discussion and without clear reliance on Security Council decisions. The most notable example remains the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Its consequences were significant not only for the region but also for the international system itself: bypassing the UN undermined trust in collective security institutions and reinforced the perception that power, rather than law, remains the decisive factor in global politics.

Nevertheless, criticism of the UN’s practice does not lead to the conclusion that the organization itself is useless. On the contrary, the absence of an effective alternative makes the question of its use even more pressing. The UN was established after two world wars as an attempt to build a mechanism for preventing global catastrophes. Its most important political and normative achievement was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its institutional logic was originally built around the idea of collective responsibility for peace.

At the same time, the weaknesses of the UN are not accidental. They are embedded in the very model of its creation. The organization was formed by the victorious states of World War II, which simultaneously sought to create a universal international order while preserving their own privileges. As a result, a system emerged that combines the principles of formal equality of states in the General Assembly with the exceptional position of the permanent members of the Security Council. This contradiction persists to this day.

That is why, in the current situation, the question should not be framed in terms of abstract trust or distrust in the UN, but in terms of the practical use of the mechanisms that still remain available. Given the risk of further escalation of the conflict between the United States and Iran, it is necessary to urgently activate the procedures for collective response provided for by the UN Charter and established international practice.

The first step could be to bring the issue before the UN Security Council for urgent consideration. Such a move would be meaningful even if the Council failed to reach a consensus decision. The discussion itself would create an institutional and political framework for international pressure in favor of de-escalation, as well as for coordinating minimum risk-reduction measures, including the safety of international shipping and preventing further expansion of the conflict.

If the Security Council proves unable to act due to disagreements among its permanent members, a second path remains — convening an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly under Resolution 377 A (V), “Uniting for Peace.” This mechanism was specifically designed for situations in which the Security Council cannot act in the face of threats to international peace and security. In such cases, the General Assembly does not replace the Security Council but gains the ability to articulate a consolidated position of the international community and recommend collective political and diplomatic measures.

Of course, the powers of the General Assembly are limited. Its resolutions do not carry the same binding legal force as Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, in crisis situations, not only formal binding force matters, but also international legitimacy. A politically consolidated position of the majority of states can influence the calculations of the parties to the conflict, especially when further escalation entails high economic, military, and reputational costs.

A skeptical position is predictable: if the UN failed to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine, why should it be more effective in the case of a conflict between the United States and Iran? However, these situations are not identical. In the case of the Russia–Ukraine war, one of the permanent members of the Security Council is a direct party to the conflict and systematically blocks any decisions directed against itself. In the case of Iran, the configuration of interests may be less rigid. For some international actors, including European states and China, de-escalation is objectively preferable to further escalation. Moreover, for the United States, the issue of international legitimacy of its actions may also have practical significance, especially given domestic political constraints and public sensitivity to prolonged military involvement.

In this sense, the task of the international community is not to idealize the UN, but to use it as the only universal platform where a collective position on issues of war and peace can still be formulated. The alternative is the final consolidation of a model in which international crises are resolved exclusively by force and outside any common procedures. This trend is already visible, but its further consolidation would mean not just weakening the UN, but further erosion of the entire international security system.

The conflict between the United States and Iran has consequences far beyond bilateral relations. It affects the stability of the Middle East, the security of global transport routes, energy markets, and overall macroeconomic stability. If it escalates further, it could provoke not only regional but also global destabilization. That is why its resolution should not be viewed solely as a matter of the balance of power between two states. It is a question of the international order as a whole.

Under these conditions, turning to UN mechanisms is not an illusion, but a sign of political realism. Despite all its limitations, the UN remains the only structure in which the issue of de-escalation can be addressed in a universal rather than bloc-based format. And if the international community does not even attempt to use these instruments, this will become further evidence that the world is finally returning to a logic of power rather than law.

Lev Ponomarev, President of the Andrei Sakharov Institute
Nikolai Koblyakov, co-founder of Russie-Libertés, co-director of the Andrei Sakharov Institute
Elena Kotenochkina, staff member of the Andrei Sakharov Institute

Published on Ekho Moskvy on April 21, 2026.